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Abstract. In this paper it is shown how a partial semantics for presuppositions can be given which
is empirically more satisfactory than its predecessors, and how this semantics can be integrated with
a technically sound, compositional grammar in the Montagovian fashion. Additionally, it is argued
that the classical objection to partial accounts of presupposition projection, namely that they lack
“flexibility,” is based on a misconception. Partial logics can give rise to flexible predictions without
postulating any ad hoc ambiguities. Finally, it is shown how the partial foundation can be combined
with a dynamic system of common-ground maintenance to account for accommodation.
Key words: Accommodation, flexibility, Montague Grammar, partial logic, presupposition projec-
tion, type theory
1. Introduction
The use of partiality for the treatment of presupposition predates all other ap-
proaches: when Frege (1892) introduced the notion of presupposition he tied it
explicitly to the possibility of sentences lacking a truth value. Since Strawson’s
rediscovery of presupposition and its partial treatment, an enormous number of
partial and multivalent accounts have been proposed, for example, Strawson (1950,
1952), Van Fraassen (1971), Herzberger (1973), Keenan (1973), Blau (1978),
Martin (1979), Thomason (1979), Seuren (1980), Bergmann (1981), Humberstone
(1981), Link (1986) and Burton-Roberts (1989). One might then think that the
subject has been done to death. But the current paper should make it clear that, on
the contrary, important issues in the partial treatment of presupposition have not,
up until now, been studied adequately, and significant lines of research have never
been given a technical explication.
From a technical point of view, partial semantics offers the attractive possibility
of basing an account of presupposition in a well understood logical setting, and one
where the intuition that sentences uttered in a given context may fail to be true or
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false is quite clear.? As will be shown, the ease with which logical properties of the
system can be assessed in turn facilitates exploration of the linguistic predictions
of the theory.
Although the literature on partial approaches to presupposition has been largely
concerned with propositional systems, there have been some proposals for partial
and multivalent systems in which the interaction of presuppositions and quantifiers
have been studied: we are thinking here of Karttunen and Peters (1979), and pro-
posals by Cooper (1983) and Hausser (1976). We do not wish to deny that there
are many important insights in this earlier work, but there do remain problems.
Karttunen and Peters’ proposal suffers from empirical problems since although
presuppositional expressions may occur within the scope of quantifiers, the presup-
positions themselves may not be bound in their system. Cooper provided a solution
to this problem, but in his proposal, the presuppositions associated with quantifiers
must be stipulated for each quantifier and do not have any independent empirical or
technical motivation. Hausser’s proposals, first put forward in the earliest days of
Montague Grammar, suffer from technical shortcomings: the partial-type theory he
uses is a special purpose formalism which does not appear to maintain the attractive
logical properties of classical-type theory, and it is difficult to establish formally
that derivations in his proposed grammar proceed with the desired results. In the
process of presenting our own account, which contains a number of substantially
new ingredients, we also hope to succeed in showing how the results achieved by
earlier researchers can be tidied up. This will clarify which aspects of the earlier
accounts represent real obstacles to progress and which are better seen as mere
technical shortcomings.
One empirical issue in particular will be highlighted in this paper: the interac-
tion of presupposition and quantification. This may be illustrated with the following
examples:
(1) Somebody managed to succeed George V on the throne of England.
(2) A fat man pushes his bicycle.
(3) Everyone who serves his king will be rewarded.
(4) Every nation cherishes its king.
These examples are drawn from Karttunen and Peters (1979) and Heim (1983).
In the fourth example, for instance, the presupposition trigger “its king,” carrying
the presupposition that the referent of “its” has a king, occurs in the scope of
the quantifier “every.” The possibility of what might be called “quantifying into
presuppositions” was little studied before these papers.??
? For further discussion of these issues we refer to Beaver (1995, 1997) and Krahmer (1998:
ch. 1).
?? Note that the question of what happens when a presuppositional expression occurs bound within
the scope of a quantifier is not to be confused with the issue of what presuppositions (e.g., existence
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The main goals of this paper are to show how a partial semantics for presup-
position can be given which is empirically more satisfactory than its predecessors,
and to demonstrate that this semantics can be integrated within a technically clean,
compositional grammar, in the spirit of Montague (and also Frege, it might be
said). To this end, we will utilize recent formal developments, primarily Muskens’
(1989) partial-type theory. It has been argued that a partial approach to presuppos-
itions is doomed to failure, since it lacks the required flexibility (see, e.g., Van der
Sandt, 1989; Soames, 1979). However, we shall argue that the examples which are
standardly presented as problematic for the partial or multivalent approach, do not
provide aknock downargument for this position. In fact, we show that it is possible
for an account of presupposition in terms of partial logic to make flexible predic-
tions about projection and, additionally, that this account can be combined with a
dynamic approach to common-ground maintenance to model accommodation. In
general, we point to several promising lines of future research concerning the effect
of pragmatic factors on the partial interpretation of utterances.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we start at the basics by
discussing various partial version of propositional logic and reviewing their ap-
plicability to presuppositions in Section 2. In Section 3 we then turn to Muskens’
partial interpretation of type theory, which is used in Section 4 as the representation
language of a Montagovian grammar which includes presuppositions. In Section 5
we discuss some of the traditional objections raised against accounts of presuppos-
ition based on partial logic (Section 5.1), and describe two extensions of the partial
account which meet these objections; in Section 5.2 we sketch how a theory can be
developed in terms of partial logic which gives rise to “flexible” projection predic-
tions, while in Section 5.3 it is illustrated how a partial account of presupposition
can be combined with a dynamic model of common-ground maintenance allowing
presupposition accommodation.
2. Partial Propositional Logic
We must start at a low level, re-introducing a number of important concepts in
the partial approach to presuppositions. In this section we discuss alternative inter-
pretations of the language of propositional logic defined over a set of propositional
constantsIP , together with a few extra operators to be defined below. In a sense, the
most basic partial logic is the one from Kleene (1952), which is generally known
asstrong Kleene. In terms of thismother of partial logicsa number of well-known
partial logics can be defined (see, e.g., Thijsse 1992). In strong Kleene a proposi-
tional formula can be either true (and not false), false (and not true) or neither (true
nor false). Following Belnap (1979) we refer to these threet uth combinationsas
T(rue), F(alse) and N(either) respectively. The following truth tables capture the
strong Kleene interpretation of the basic propositional language.
of a non-trivial quantificational domain) are triggered by quantifiers themselves. For a study of these
issues from a partial perspective, see Kerber and Kohlhase (to appear).
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DEFINITION 1 (Strong Kleene).
∧ T F N
T T F N
F F F F
N N F N
→ T F N
T T F N
F T T T
N T N N
∨ T F N
T T T T
F T F N





If we want to say something about presuppositions in this set-up, two things are
needed: (i) we need to know where presuppositions arise and (ii) we need to know
when one formula is a presupposition of another formula. To achieve the first
we add a binary presupposition operator to the language, thetransplicationfrom
Blamey (1986).
DEFINITION 2. If ϕ, π are formulae, thenϕ〈π〉 is a formula.
The intuition behind this construction is thatπ is an elementary presupposition
associated withϕ.?
One way to look at elementary presuppositions is as presuppositions which are
triggered in the lexicon. For example, a word likeregretcomes with an elementary
presupposition to the effect that the proposition which is regretted is true. Consider:
(5) Bill regrets that Mary is sad.
This sentence is represented schematically by a formula of the formq〈p〉 wherep
represents the proposition that Mary is sad, andq the proposition that Bill regrets
this. In general, the interpretation ofϕ〈π〉 can be characterized as follows:ϕ〈π〉 is
True iff bothπ andϕ are True, andϕ〈π〉 is False iffπ is True andϕ is False. This
gives rise to the following truth table:
DEFINITION 3 (Elementary Presuppositions).
T F N
T T N N
F F N N
N N N N
It is worth pointing out that elementary presuppositions may themselves con-
tain other elementary presuppositions. This is required for examples such as the
following:
(6) Bill regrets that the king of France is bald.
? The “elementary presupposition” terminology and the subscript notation derive from Van der
Sandt (1989). Blamey usesπ/ϕ as notation for transplication.
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This sentence is represented schematically by a formula of the formq〈r〈s〉〉. Here
s is the proposition that there exists a king of France,r the proposition that he is
bald, andq that Bill regrets this.
There is an alternative to this binary presupposition operator, namely the in-
troduction of aunary presupposition operator. Such an operator might have the
following truth table:





In fact,∂ is the static version of Beaver’s presupposition operator, used for the first
time in Beaver (1992). The reader is invited to check that the unary and binary
presupposition operators are interdefinable using the strong Kleene connectives:
(∂π ∧ ϕ) ∨ ¬∂π has exactly the truth table ofϕ〈π〉.
Before we continue, let us give the formal definition of strong Kleene propos-
itional logic (PL) with transplication. We follow the – rather compact – format of
Muskens (1989: 42).? We have a distributive lattice over{T,F,N}, in which the meet
∩ corresponds with conjunction, the join∪ with disjunction and the complement







For instance, the value of a conjunction of T and N, is given by T∩ N, the highest
element which is at least as low in the ordering as both T and N (given the proper-
ties of L3, this amounts to the lowest of the two), which is N. On the other hand,
the disjunction of T and N, T∪ N should be the lowest element at least as high as
both T and N, which is T.
Throughout this article, it is assumed that atomic formulae are bivalent. Thus,
a formula can only be N(either True nor False) due to presupposition failure.
Accordingly, letV : IP → {T,F} be some valuation function. Define[[ϕ]]V (the
interpretation ofϕ underV ):
? The main difference is that Muskens discusses four-valued interpretations, while we restrict our
attention to the three-valued ones. We would like to point out that the main points we make in this
paper are independent of this choice. Indeed, it could be argued that the four-valued alternative would
provide a more natural starting point for discussing two-dimensional approaches to presuppositions
such as Herzberger (1973), Karttunen and Peters (1979) or Cooper (1983).
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DEFINITION 5 (Strong Kleene PL with transplication).
1. [[p]]V = V (p), iff p ∈ IP
2. [[¬ϕ]]V = −[[ϕ]]V
3. [[ϕ ∧ ψ]]V = [[ϕ]]V ∩ [[ψ]]V
4. [[ϕ〈π〉]]V = T, iff [[π ]]V = T and[[ϕ]]V = T
[[ϕ〈π〉]]V = F, iff [[π ]]V = T and[[ϕ]]V = F
ϕ ∨ ψ is defined as¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) andϕ → ψ is defined as¬ϕ ∨ ψ . A formulaϕ
entails a formulaψ (notationϕ |= ψ) iff wheneverϕ is true,ψ is true as well.
DEFINITION 6 (Entailment).ϕ |= ψ iff for all V , if [[ϕ]]V = T, then[[ψ]]V = T.
Finally, we say thatϕ andψ are equivalent (notation:ϕ ⇔ ψ) iff [[ϕ]]V = [[ψ]]V
for all V .
So much for the formalities. Let us return to the issue of presupposing. First
we have to address the question of when an arbitrary formulaϕ presupposes some
formulaπ , which we do using the standard definition of semantic presupposition
(see discussions in Beaver, 1997, or Krahmer, 1998):
DEFINITION 7 (Presuppose).ϕ presupposesπ iff wheneverπ is not True,ϕ is
Neither true nor false.
When the presupposition (π ) is not satisfied (that is, not True), the sentence (ϕ)
as a whole does not make sense: it is Neither true nor false. We can also put it
as follows:ϕ presupposesπ iff wheneverϕ is defined (either True or False),π
is True. Going one step further, we can speak of themaximalpresupposition of
ϕ, which is the logically strongest proposition presupposed byϕ. Given thatϕ
presupposesπ iff ϕ ∨¬ϕ |= π , it follows that the maximal presupposition may be
easily identifiable (see, for example, Karttunen and Peters, 1979, or Cooper, 1983).
By convention, bythepresupposition ofϕ, we mean the maximal presupposition,
given by the disjunction of truth and falsity conditions ofϕ. We can equate the
maximal presupposition ofϕ with ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, but observe that this formula is likely
to contain elementary presuppositions itself. There are various systematic ways to
find a formula which is itself devoid of elementary presuppositions but which is
nevertheless equivalent withϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. For example, Kracht (1994) defines an al-
gorithm forpresuppositional normal forms. Here we follow another method, using
the following two unary operators.
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The A-operator dates back as far as Bochvar’s original papers (Bochvar, 1939).
Bochvar suggested that, apart from the normal mode of assertion, there was a
second mode which we might termeta-assertion. The meta-assertion ofϕ, Aϕ,
is the proposition thatϕ is True.? This gives rise to the left-most truth table in
Definition 8. Similarly, we can define ameta-denialDϕ which is the proposition
thatϕ is false, which gives rise to the second truth table in Definition 8. Obviously,
Dϕ can be defined asA¬ϕ. The following equivalences can be proved.
FACT 1 (Equivalences).
Ap ⇔ p (p ∈ IP )
Dp ⇔ ¬p (p ∈ IP )
A¬ϕ ⇔ Dϕ
D¬ϕ ⇔ Aϕ
A(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ Aϕ ∧ Aψ
D(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ Dϕ ∨Dψ
A(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ Aϕ ∨ Aψ
D(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ Dϕ ∧Dψ
A(ϕ → ψ) ⇔ Dϕ ∨ Aψ
D(ϕ→ ψ) ⇔ Aϕ ∧Dψ
A(ϕ〈π〉) ⇔ Aπ ∧ Aϕ
D(ϕ〈π〉) ⇔ Aπ ∧Dϕ
Now the (maximal) presupposition ofϕ, designated asPϕ, is defined as follows:
Pϕ = Aϕ ∨Dϕ.
So what is the presupposition ofϕ〈π〉? Some easy calculations will show that
P(ϕ〈π〉)⇔ Aπ ∧ Pϕ.
If π andϕ are bivalent, thenAπ is equivalent withπ andPϕ is equivalent with>,
soP(ϕ〈π〉) = π . In other words,ϕ〈π〉 (at least) presupposesπ , as intended. But how
about other formulae? A well-known feature of elementary presuppositions is that
sometimes they survive when embedded under one or more logical operators, while
at other times they do not. The problem of predicting when which presuppositions
survive is known as theprojection problem, a phrase suggested in Langendoen and
Savin (1971). Consider the following natural language examples:
(7) It is not the case that Bill regrets that Mary is sad.
(8) If Bill regrets that Mary is sad, then he’ll soothe her.
In an intuitive sense, both these sentences seem to presuppose that Mary is sad. It
is easily seen thatP¬ϕ ⇔ Pϕ. Thus, translating (7) into a strong Kleene-based
representation language yields the prediction that it shares its presupposition with
(5). But what about (8)? Here is the general rule for implications:
P(ϕ→ ψ)⇔ (Pϕ ∨ Aψ) ∧ (Dϕ ∨ Pψ).
? The terminology “co-assertion” is used in Link (1986), essentially for a similar operation which
causes presuppositions to be asserted.
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We can represent (8) as(q〈p〉 → r), wherep is the proposition Mary is sad,q
the proposition that Bill regrets this andr the proposition that Bill soothes Mary.
Given what we have seen so far, this means that the following presupposition is
(incorrectly) predicted for (8):?
P (q〈p〉 → r)⇔ p ∨ r.
In words, the predicted presupposition can be paraphrased as “either Mary is sad,
or Bill will soothe her.”
In general, it should be clear that applying the equivalences from Fact 1 from left
to right gives a method of rewritingPϕ to a formula which is free of transplications
and contains no occurrences ofA orD. This provides us with a general method to
rewritePϕ to a classical formula which gives the presupposition ofϕ.
Above, we noted that it is possible to define a number of interesting logicsin
terms ofstrong Kleene. Here we briefly mention two of those: Peters (1975) three-
valued logic (called middle Kleene in Krahmer, 1994) and weak Kleene (a.k.a.
Bochvar’s internal logic, viz. Bochvar, 1939). To begin with the former, the Peters
connectives are given by the following truth tables (to distinguish them from the
strong Kleene ones we add a dot above them).
DEFINITION 9 (Peters Connectives).
∧̇ T F N
T T F N
F F F F
N N N N
→̇ T F N
T T F N
F T T T
N N N N
∨̇ T F N
T T T T
F T F N





These can be defined in terms of the strong Kleene system as follows:
DEFINITION 10 (Peters connectives in terms of strong Kleene).
1. ϕ ∧̇ ψ = (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ),
2. ϕ ∨̇ ψ = (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ),
3. ϕ →̇ ψ = (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ).
The intuition behind these definitions can be put as follows: the left-most sub-
formula has to be defined before the rightmost subformula becomes relevant.
If we represent example (8) as(q〈p〉 →̇ r), we get different predictions about
presupposition projection. Some calculations show that the general rule is
P(ϕ →̇ ψ)⇔ Pϕ ∧ (Dϕ ∨ Pψ).
For our example this means that it is (correctly) predicted that (8) presupposes that
Mary is sad (p).
? Recall that throughout this paper we assume that the only source of partiality comes from failing
presuppositions.
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We finally mention the (internal) Bochvar/weak Kleene alternative. It differs
from the other two systems discussed above in that it has a different underlying
intuition for the N value. In strong Kleene, it is understood as Neither true nor
false, while in weak Kleene it is better thought of asNonsense. The truth tables are
set up according to the principle that when one subformula does not make sense,
then the entire formula is nonsensical. To separate the weak Kleene connectives
from the others, we place two dots above them.
DEFINITION 11 (Weak Kleene).
∧̈ T F N
T T F N
F F F N
N N N N
→̈ T F N
T T F N
F T T N
N N N N
∨̈ T F N
T T T N
F T F N





Even though the underlying philosophy of the N value is different, it is possible to
define the weak Kleene connectives in terms of the strong Kleene ones.
DEFINITION 12 (Weak Kleene connectives in terms of strong Kleene).
1. ϕ ∧̈ ψ = (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)∨ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ),
2. ϕ ∨̈ ψ = (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)∧ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ),
3. ϕ →̈ ψ = (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ∧ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ).
Weak Kleene makes clear and uniform predictions concerning projection: every
elementary presupposition projects, no matter where it originated. In linguistic
literature, this is known as thecumulativeanalysis of presuppositions (originally
introduced by Langendoen and Savin, 1971). Here is one instance:
P(ϕ →̈ ψ)⇔ (Pϕ ∧ Pψ).
It is not difficult to come up with counterexamples to this prediction. Consider:
(9) If Mary is sad, then Bill regrets that Mary is sad.
Intuitively, this sentence does not carry a presupposition to the effect that Mary is
sad, nevertheless translating the implication using→̈ would predict exactly that.
Still, weak Kleene can be useful in a theory of presuppositions as we shall see
below.
156 D. BEAVER AND E. KRAHMER
3. Partiality and Type Theory
A characteristic feature ofMontague Grammar? is that natural language expres-
sions are translated into a representation language calledInt nsional Logic(IL).
Several authors have argued for a replacement of IL byTwo-sorted Type Theory
(TY2) (see, for example, Gallin, 1975; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984; Muskens,
1989). TY2 is essentially the logic of Church (1940) – based on the type-theoretical
work of Russell and Ramsey early 20th century – but with an extra ground types.
The system we discuss here is TY32 (Three-valued, two-sorted type theory) from
Muskens (1989).
DEFINITION 13 (TY32 types).
1. e, s andt are types,
2. if a andb are types, then(ab) is a type.
So there are two sorts of types: basic types (includings, which is not basic in
IL) and complex types. The TY32 expressions are defined in the following fashion.
Assume that we have a setCONa of constants of typea, andVARa of variables of
typea. An expression of typet is called a formula.
DEFINITION 14 (TY32 syntax).
1. If ϕ andψ are formulae, then¬ϕ, (ϕ∨ψ), (ϕ→ ψ) and(ϕ∧ψ) are formulae.
2. If ϕ is a formula andx ∈ VAR, then∀xϕ and∃xϕ are formulae.
3. If α is an expression of type(ab) andβ is an expression of typea, then(αβ)
is an expression of typeb.
4. If α is an expression of typeb andx ∈ VARa, thenλx(α) is an expression of
type(ab).
5. If α andβ are expressions of the same type, then(α ≡ β) is a formula.
6. ? is a formula.
The main difference with the syntax of IL (for those in the know) is the absence of
the notorious caps and cups.
Let us now turn to the semantics. TY32 models are defined as follows:M =〈{Da}a, I 〉. Here{Da}a is a TY32 frame, in which each typea is associated with
its own domainDa in such a way thatDe andDs are non-empty sets, andDt =
{T,F,N}. As above, we assume that presupposition failure is the only source of
partiality; all atomic formulae are assumed to be either True or False.D(ab) is the
set of (total) functions fromDa to Db. I is the interpretation function ofM. It
has the set of constants as its domain such thatI (c) ∈ Da for all c ∈ CONa. We
? We use the term Montague Grammar to refer to the so-called PTQ fragment as it was described
in Montague (1974). Good introductions to Montague Grammar are Dowty et al. (1981) and Gamut
(1991).
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also have a set of total assignmentsG such that for anyg ∈ G andx ∈ VARa,
g(x) ∈ Da. g[d/x] is the assignment which differs only fromg at most in that
g[d/x](x) = d. Define [[α]]TY32M,g (the interpretation of a TY32 expressionα in a
modelM with respect to an assignmentg, suppressing sub- and superscripts where
this can be done without creating confusion):
DEFINITION 15 (TY32 semantics).
1. [[c]] = I (c), if c ∈ CON
[[x]] = g(x), if x ∈ VAR
2. [[¬ϕ]] = −[[ϕ]]
3. [[ϕ ∧ ψ]] = [[ϕ]] ∩ [[ψ]]
4. [[∀xaϕ]]g = ⋂d∈Da [[ϕ]]g[d/x]
5. [[αβ]] = [[α]]([[β]])
6. [[λxaα]]g = the functionf such thatf (d) = [[α]]g[d/x],
for all d ∈ Da
7. [[α ≡ β]] = T, iff [[α]] = [[β]]
= F, iff [[α]] 6= [[β]]
8. [[?]] = N
Here−, ∩ and⋂ are again operations on L3. Disjunction, implication and exist-
ential quantification are defined in the normal fashion. This is a very-well-behaved
logic, with lots of nice meta-theoretical results.? Notice that clauses 2 and 3 are the
same as for propositional logic. Hence, TY32 follows the strong Kleene pattern. All
the important constructions from the previous section (such as transplication, and
the assertion (A) and denial (D) operators) can be defined in terms of the language
of TY32. In general, we use the following abbreviations:
??
DEFINITION 16 (Abbreviations).
> abbreviates ? ≡ ?
⊥ abbreviates ¬>
ϕ ∨ ψ abbreviates ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
ϕ→ ψ abbreviates ¬(ϕ ∧¬ψ)
∃xϕ abbreviates ¬∀x¬ϕ
ϕ ∧̇ ψ abbreviates (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ϕ)
? Cf. Muskens (1989: ch. 5). For instance, the system has a sound and complete axiomatization
with respect to a class of generalized frames, and – unlike IL – it enjoys Church–Rosser (or diamond)
normalization.
?? Only the definitions of ∧̇ and ∧̈ are given. Of course,∨̇ , ∨̈ , →̇ and →̈ are defined
analogously. See Definitions 10 and 12.
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ϕ ∧̈ ψ abbreviates (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ϕ) ∨ (¬ψ ∧ ψ)
∂π abbreviates (π ≡ >) ∨ ?
ϕ〈π〉 abbreviates (∂π ∧ ϕ)∨ ¬∂π
Aϕ abbreviates (ϕ ≡ >) ∨ ⊥
Dϕ abbreviates A¬ϕ
The type-theoretical counterpart for Fact 1 is Fact 2 below. Ifϕ is a first-order
sentence with transplication, andA andD as the only extra connectives, then these
rules suffice to get rid of the occurrences ofA,D and transplication inAϕ andDϕ
(provided, of course, that atomic formulae are bivalent, as we assume throughout).
FACT 2 (Equivalences).
Aϕ ⇔ ϕ, if ϕ is atomic
Dϕ ⇔ ¬ϕ, if ϕ is atomic
A¬ϕ ⇔ Dϕ
D¬ϕ ⇔ Aϕ
A(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ Aϕ ∧ Aψ
D(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ Dϕ ∨Dψ
A(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ Aϕ ∨ Aψ
D(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ Dϕ ∧Dψ
A(ϕ → ψ) ⇔ Dϕ ∨ Aψ
D(ϕ→ ψ) ⇔ Aϕ ∧Dψ
A(ϕ〈π〉) ⇔ Aπ ∧ Aϕ





Finally, we observe that TY32 supports the following facts:
?
FACT 3 (Equivalences).
1. λv(ϕ)β is equivalent with[β/v]ϕ, providedβ is free forv in ϕ.
2. λv(ϕ v) is equivalent withϕ, providedv does not occur free inϕ.
3. λvϕ is equivalent withλw[w/v]ϕ, providedw is free forv in ϕ.
The first of these facts is known as beta reduction, the second as eta conversion,
and the third as alpha conversion.
4. Presuppositional Montague Grammar: Examples
Let us now turn to a reformulation of Karttunen and Peters’ system using TY32. We
shall refer to the resulting system asPresuppositional Montague Grammar. Before
we start, a note about the notation. Application is written without brackets on the
? Here[β/v]ϕ is the substitution ofβ for all free occurrences ofv in ϕ. We say that a variable
y is free forv in ϕ iff no free occurrence ofv in ϕ is within the scope of a quantifier∃y or ∀y or a
lambda operatorλy. The proofs carry over from Muskens (1989).
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understanding that association is to the left. So,sootheabi should be read as in
statei, b (subject) soothesa (object).? Notice that this is analogous to the IL for-
mula∨sootheab, IL instances of cup operators being replaced by explicit function
application to a state variablei. Similarly, the IL formula∧sootheab corresponds
with λi(sootheabi) in TY2, IL’s cap operators being replaced with explicit abstrac-
tion over states (compare the embedding of IL in TY2, Gallin, 1975). The fragment
we present is intensional: sentences of English are translated into TY32 expressions
of type(st), such expressions will be calledpropositions. Otherwise, we introduce
the relevant concepts as we go along. Let us begin with example (1), repeated
here as (10). Following Karttunen and Peters, we assume that the English phrase
“manage to X” carries a presupposition (conventional implicaturein Karttunen and
Peters’ terms) that the subject had difficulty inX-ing, and for this purpose we use
a constantdifficult in the translation. Note that we do not especially wish to push
this as an analysis of “manage,” but use it to exemplify the difference between
Karttunen and Peters’ system and the present one – the relevant differences could
equally well be discerned with more paradigmatic examples of presuppositions,
such as those arising with definite descriptions or factives.
(10) ? Somebody managed to succeed George V (on the throne of England).
This sentence is odd. Karttunen and Peters’ system does not account for this oddity.
Their system predicts that (10) presupposes that some individual, about whom
no more is known, had difficulty succeeding George V. The problem is that this
presupposition is too weak. For, as Karttunen and Peters themselves observed, it
is certainly the case that there are people for whom the operation of succeeding
George V is/was difficult, so that the weak presupposition predicted in their system
is satisfied; they predict that (10) does not suffer from presupposition failure, it
makes perfect sense.
Let us now look at example (10) from the perspective of this paper. Here is the
classical PTQ structure derived for this example:??
(11) [somebody[managed to[succeed George V]5]8]4
The superscripts 4, 5 and 8 refer to three of the seventeen rules of which the PTQ
fragment consist. Essentially, all three are straightforward rules ofFunctional Ap-
plication (FA). Appendix A contains all the relevant details about Presuppositional
Montague Grammar. It describes how trees are constructed and defines a function
(.)• from trees to TY32 expressions. Informally, functional application is translated
as follows:([ξ ϑ]fa) = ξ •ϑ•. We need the following lexical items:‡
? In general,ξϕ1 . . . ϕn should be read as(. . . (ξϕ1) . . . ϕn).
?? We shall ignore the PPon the throne of England.
‡ Here and elsewhere we use the following type-convention:p, q are variables ranging over pro-
positions (have type(st)), P over properties (type(st)),Q over quantifiers (type(e(st))(st)), x, y
over individuals (typee), i, j over states (types), g is a constant of type, succeedis a constant of
type(e(e(st))) anddifficult is a constant of type((e(st))(e(st))).
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somebody• = λPλi∃x(P xi)
managed to• = λPλxλj (P xj〈(difficult P) xj〉)
succeed• = λQλy(Qλx(succeedxy))
George V• = λP (P g)
BelowH⇒η indicates that one or more eta reductions have been carried out, and
H⇒β that that one or more beta reductions have been applied.
1. ([succeed George V])• =
succeed• George V• =
λQλy(Qλx(succeedxy))λP (P g) H⇒β
λy(succeedgy) H⇒η
succeedg
2. ([manage to [succeed George V]])• =
λPλxλj (P xj〈(difficult P) xj )succeedg H⇒β
λxλj (succeedgxj〈(difficult (succeedg)) xj )
3. ([somebody [managed to [succeed George V]]])• =
λPλi∃y(P yi)λxλj (succeedgxj〈(difficult (succeedg)) xj ) H⇒β
λi∃y(succeedgyi〈(difficult (succeedg)) yi〉)
The derived proposition can be phrased as follows: it is a function from states to
truth values, and given a states there has to be someone of which it is asserted that
he succeeded George V ins and presupposed thathe(and not just any person) had
difficulty to succeed George V ins. What presupposition is predicted by the use
of TY32 for this sentence, and is it an improvement over the predictions derived in
Karttunen and Peters’ system?
First, let us define what it means for a type-theoretical formula to presuppose
another.
DEFINITION 17 (Presuppose: TY32). Let π andϕ be expressions of typest . We
say thatϕ presupposesπ iff for all modelsM, assignmentsg and states:
If [[πs]]M,g 6= T, then[[ϕs]]M,g = N.
Whenϕ is of the formλiψ , whereψ is itselfλ-free, we define
Pϕ = λj (A(ϕj) ∨D(ϕj)).
In the case of (10) this amounts to the following:
(12) λi(∃y((difficult (succeedg)) yi ∧ succeedgyi) ∨
∀y((difficult (succeedg)) yi ∧ ¬succeedgyi))
In words, either there is someone who had difficulty succeeding George V but did
so anyway or it was difficult for everyone to succeed George V and no-one actually
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did succeed him. Notice that the first disjunct gives the condition under which (10)
is True, while the second disjunct gives the condition under which it is False. That
is, these conditions tell us when – in the Strawsonian fashion – example (10) makes
“sense.”
In need of explanation is the oddity of (10). Does the presupposition we just
derived capture this oddity? Notice that both disjuncts of the presupposition are
contradicted by history, since Edward VIII did not have a particularly hard time
following his predecessor as it was his birthright; the presupposition is false. So,
intuitively (10) is predicted to be a case of presupposition failure, which may be
taken as an explanation of its oddity. Does this outcome also correspond with the
intuitions about sentence (10)? This is in fact a very difficult question. There does
not seem to be any consensus as to what the intuitive presuppositions of (10) are.
In fact, there is no consensus at all about presuppositions containing a free variable
which is bound by a quantifier outside the scope of the presupposition. We believe
that empirical research should clarify these matters (a first start in this direction is
carried out in Beaver, 1994a). Below we return to this issue.
Let us now turn to one of the examples from Heim (1983), say (4), repeated
here as (13).
(13) Every nation cherishes its king.
We just mentioned that the intuitions about presupposition-quantification interac-
tion differ widely. However, there appears to be a consensus that presuppositions
under universal quantifiers do not give rise to universal presuppositions. Thus,
for instance, (13) does not come with an intuitive presupposition to the effect
that every nation has a king. Nevertheless, this is the presupposition Heim’s sys-
tem predicts. Let us see how Presuppositional Montague Grammar does. To deal
with this example in Montague Grammar we need to invoke the notorious rule of
quantifying-in(qi,n labeled 14, n in the original PTQ fragment). Here is the schem-
atic syntactic structure of (13), all rules follow the FA pattern unless otherwise
indicated:
[[every nation] [he0 [cherishes[his0 king]]]]qi,0
The pronouns with a subscript are Montague’s syntactic variables. The possessive
his0 is our addition.? Syntactically qi,0 replaces the first occurrence ofhe0 for the
NP every nation, and all subsequent syntactic variables with the same index are
replaced for suitable anaphoric pronouns. The corresponding translation rule looks
roughly as follows (again, Appendix A contains the formal details):
([ξ ϑ]qi,n)• = ξ •(λxnϑ•).
? The addition of hisn is not, strictly speaking, necessary. A first alternative is to analyzehisn king
as an abbreviation ofthe king of hen. A second alternative is to isolate the meaning of’s and combine
it with hen to form hisn. This second alternative is formally worked out in Appendix A.
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For this example we need the following translations of lexical items:?
every• = λP1λP2λi∀x(P1 xi →̇ P2 xi)
nation• = nation
hen• = λP (P xn)
cherishes• = λQλy(Qλx(cherishxy))
hisn• = λP1λP2λi∃y((P1 yi ∧̇ of yxni ∧̇ P2 yxni)〈∃!z(P1 zi ∧̇ of zxni)〉)
king• = king
We have assumed that possessives trigger a uniqueness presupposition, but nothing
hinges on that. Here are the crucial steps in the translation:
1. ([he0 cherishes his0 king])• =
λi∃y((king yi ∧̇ of yx0i ∧̇ cherishyx0i)〈∃!x(kingxi ∧̇ of xx0i)〉)
2. ([every nation])• =
λPλj∀z(nationzj → P zj)
3. ([[every nation] [he0 cherishes his0 king]]qi,0)•) =
λj∀z(nationzj →̇ ∃y((king yj ∧̇ of yzj ∧̇ cherishyzj)〈∃!x(kingxj ∧̇ of xzj)〉))
Heim predicts that example (13) presupposes (14).
(14) Every nation has a king.
As said above, there is no consensus about what precisely is presupposed by (13).
However, it is clear that we do not want to predict a purely universal presupposition
and, additionally, we do not want to run in Karttunen and Peter’s binding problem.
The presupposition of the translation we have just derived meets these two de-
siderata. The derived presupposition amounts once again to the disjunction of the
assertion and denial conditions and, as we have seen above, the former is universal
while the latter is existential. The predicted presupposition can be paraphrased as:
(15) Either every nation has a king it cherishes or there is a nation which has a king
it does not cherish.
In other words, a presupposition is predicted which is weaker than Heim’s. Notice
again that the first disjunct paraphrases the condition under which (13) is True,
while the second disjunct paraphrases the condition under which it is False; the
disjunction tells us when (13) “makes sense.”??
? For the sake of argument, we have chosen to use the Peters connectives in the translations,
because they represent the Karttunen-style treatment of presuppositions. It should be stressed that for
these examples choosing the Peters connectives has no special consequences. In fact, using strong
Kleene connectives would lead to exactly the same predictions here.
?? The empirical study in Beaver (1994a) provides evidence concerning the interpretation of sen-
tences such as (13), where a presupposition is triggered in the scope of a quantificational determiner.
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The machinery we have used so far is essentially enough to deal with the
remaining two Heimian examples from the introduction as well. Appendix A
contains all the details which are required to construct syntactic trees for these ex-
amples, and to calculate their corresponding TY32 representation. As far as example
(2) is concerned, the only non-alphabetical difference with (4) is that anexistential
quantifier is quantified-in and not a universal one. Since existential quantification
is defined as the dual of universal quantification, it is easily seen that no univer-
sal presupposition is predicted for this example either (contrary to Heim, 1983,
who predicts a universal presupposition for this example as well). Example (3)
is slightly more involved since it contains a relative clause. However, these do not
pose any problems for classical Montague Grammar (just use rule 2, n). And again,
no universal presupposition is predicted, but a weaker disjunctive one.
So what have we achieved so far? We have shown that it is possible to define
a Montague Grammar which deals with both assertions and presuppositions, but
does not run into the problems Karttunen and Peters’ system has with sentences
such as (1). What is more, the fragment can also deal with the quantificational
examples discussed in Heim (1983) and which play an important rôle in the recent
partial dynamic approaches to presuppositions. It is interesting to note that there
is nothing dynamic about TY32, it is just a standard static logic albeit a partial one.
Actually, this is not the first attempt to partialize Montague Grammar in order to
deal with presuppositions, Hausser (1976) and Cooper (1983) are two old (late
seventies) predecessors. Our system is really in their spirit. The main difference
is that we have benefitted from the pioneering work of Muskens (1989), which
arguably is the first “clean” partialization of Montague Grammar with clear logical
properties.
5. Extensions to the Partial Account
5.1. ALLEGED LIMITATIONS OF THE PARTIAL ACCOUNT
There are two types of objections which can be leveled at any theory of presuppos-
ition: that it predicts overly strong presuppositions and that it predicts overly weak
presuppositions. Both of these objections have been leveled at various aspects of
multivalent accounts.
There it is shown that the presupposition in such cases is not accommodated into the restrictor of the
determiner, which would result in (13) having the interpretation “every nation with a king cherishes
it.” However, there are examples in the literature where a presupposition in the sytactic scope of a
quantifier appears to be accommodated in the restrictor. Typically in such examples, the quantifier is
an adverb or a (possibly implicit) generic, e.g. “People usually clean up after their pets,” where the
class of people quantified over is presumably restricted to pet owners. In Beaver (1994b), it is argued
that the apparent accommodation of a presupposition in such cases is misleading, and that what is
really being accommodated is adiscourse topic. The confusion arises because presupposed material
is commonly, although not necessarily, topical.
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Of the objections regarding overly strong predictions, the examples where a
presupposition iscancelledare best known. An example is the following, where
the speaker is clearly not committed to Bill being happy, despite the factive verb
“know” being used:
(16) Mary doesn’tknowthat Bill is happy, she merely believes it.
The standard solution to this problem within multivalent accounts is to postulate a
secondpresupposition cancellingnegation with a truth table as the following:





However, this then meets with the further objection that linguistic evidence does
not support the presence of a lexical ambiguity. It is argued that if negation is
ambiguous in this way, we should expect there to be languages in which there
are non-homophonous realizations of the two lexical entries, but Horn (1985)
points out that whilst there are many languages with distinct negations, there is
no language in which the distinction seems to correspond to the presupposition-
projecting/presupposition-cancelling dichotomy. Not only is the postulation of a
second negationad hoc, but it is also a distinctly limited solution for what is clearly
a wider problem. Sticking at least to cases of denial, observe that the following
variant of the above example (from Beaver, 1997) exhibits identical presupposition
cancelling behaviour, at least when uttered by an Englishman:
(17) If Mary knowsthat Bill is happy, then I’m a Dutchman – she merely believes
it.
It seems most undesirable for an ambiguity of implication to be postulated paral-
leling the claimed ambiguity of negation, solely so that this “non-standard” use of
implication for denial can be treated.
The most troublesome of all the logical connectives with regard to presupposi-
tion is surely disjunction, a point made most forcefully by Soames (1979). Consider
examples (18–24). The constuctionstop doing Xpresupposes having doneX be-
fore, whilestart doing Xpresupposes not having doneX before. Projection of this
presupposition can occur from the left disjunct (as in (18)), the right disjunct (19),
or both disjuncts (20). Cancellation of the presupposition in the left disjunct can
occur (21), as can cancellation of the presupposition in the right disjunct (22).
Furthermore, simultaneous cancellation of presuppositions in both disjuncts can
occur, either as a result of the assertions in each disjunct cancelling the presuppos-
itions in the other (23), or as a result of the presuppositions of the disjuncts being
inconsistent with each other (24).
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(18) Either Bill has stopped smoking, or he doesn’t have enough money to buy
cigarettes.
(19) Either Bill doesn’t have enough money to buy cigarettes, or he’s stopped
smoking.
(20) Either Bill has just stopped smoking, or else he’s just started doing some
exercise.
(21) Either Bill has just stopped smoking, or he never did smoke and just carried
that lighter around as a pose.
(22) Either Bill always did smoke, but only when nobody was watching, or else
he’s just started smoking.
(23) Either Bill just stopped smoking, and never did drink, or else he just stopped
drinking, and never did smoke.
(24) Either Bill has just stopped smoking, or else he’s just started smoking.
It is quite impossible that any single multivalent truth table for disjunction will
predict all these possibilities, and attempting to solve the problem by introducing a
multiple lexical ambiguity for disjunction seems a most unattractive prospect.
As said, partial approaches to presupposition projection have also been criti-
cized for making predictions which are too weak. Within a multivalent semantics
certain operators may behave as filters, neither allowing uniform projection of
presuppositions nor forcing uniform cancellation. Various of the disjunctions that
might be defined to meet one or other of the above examples are of this type.
However, such filters do not work in quite the way that Karttunen envisaged when
he coined the termfilter in Karttunen (1973). For in the model he proposed there,
presupposition triggers are thought of as being associated with a single presup-
posed proposition, “knows that Bill is happy,” for instance, being associated with
the proposition “Bill is happy.” A filtering operator taking a sentence with this
trigger as an argument could do either of two things: it could allow the proposition
“Bill is happy” to be projected, or it could prevent that projection. But multivalent
models exhibit more complex behavior. Consider:
(25) If Mary is clever, she knows that Bill is happy.
Suppose that conditionals are given a semantics in accordance with the strong
Kleene implication (or the Peters one, for that matter). Then sentence (25) does
not simply carry the presupposition “Bill is happy.” But neither does this pre-
supposition vanish altogether. Rather, we obtain a conditional presupposition to
the effect “if Mary is clever then Bill is happy.” As it happens, these conditional
presuppositions are by now generally associated with Karttunen’s work, since they
do arise in Karttunen (1974) and Karttunen and Peters (1979) – see Geurts (1995)
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and Beaver (1997) for discussion. Conditional presuppositions have been attacked,
for instance, in Gazdar (1979), as being inappropriately weak. Let us briefly point
out here that there are also examples for which Karttunen-style conditional presup-
positions do seem to capture the intuitions. Consider the following example from
Beaver (1995):
(26) If Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X, he will be bothered by the fact that his
weight is higher than it would be on earth.
Here, the consequent is associated with the elementary presupposition that Space-
man Spiff’s weight is higher than it would be on Earth. Intuitively we would
not want to associate this presupposition with example (26) as a whole. Neither
would we want it to disappear entirely. Rather, we would like to predict the condi-
tional/filtered presupposition which strong Kleene/Peters would predict and which
may be paraphrased as “if Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X his weight will be
higher than it would be on Earth.”
Thus, sometimes a presupposition which arises in the consequent of an im-
plication should project strongly (as for (25)) while at other times a weaker
presupposition is desired (viz. (26)). In fact, this is a good illustration of the
fundamental point of criticism which has been leveled at partial and multivalent
approaches to presuppositions: they lack the desiredflexibility. Once a connective
has been assigned a partial interpretation, it makes rigid predictions concerning
presupposition projection. Once implication is assigned a truth table, any formula
representing a conditional is associated with the same presupposition. Thus, given
the truth table of implication in Definition 1 for strong Kleene, only conditional
presuppositions are predicted. By contrast, giving it a weak Kleene interpretation,
we never predict conditional presuppositions. Soames’ examples clearly illustrate
that projection from disjunctions is an even more flexible matter. However, giving
disjunction a partial interpretation means that we always predict the same projec-
tion behavior.? So, the conclusion is that no single partial logic can account for
all the projection facts, and this is indeed what is claimed in, for instance, van der
Sandt (1989) and Soames (1979). However, as we will show, this does not mean
that the defender of a partial approach is forced to postulate multiple ambiguities,
and it certainly does not mean that partial and multivalent logics are useless when
it comes to the treatment of presupposition.
5.2. FLEXIBILITY : THE FLOATING A THEORY
There is an alternative to postulating a lexical ambiguity and we have already been
using its main ingredient – the assertion operatorA – throughout this article. So
? Thus, strong Kleene disjunction yields uniform weak (conditional) presuppositions, Peters dis-
junction predicts that elementary presuppositions from the left disjunct project, weak Kleene that
every elementary presupposition projects.
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far, we used theA operator (together with its counterpart, theD operator) to de-
termine the presuppositions of arbitrary sentences. However,A also has a different
use, as we shall argue, namely as apresupposition wipe-out device. Whatever is
presupposed by some formulaϕ, it is easily seen from the truth table of the A
operator thatAϕ presupposes nothing. It is notable that the cancelling negation∼
(Bochvar’s external negation) can be defined in terms of¬ andA.?
FACT 4. ∼ ϕ is equivalent with¬Aϕ.
Thus, whilst the possibility of declaring natural language negation to be ambiguous
between¬ and ∼ exists within Bochvar’s extended system, another possibil-
ity would be to translate natural language negation uniformly using¬, but then
allow that sometimes the proposition under the negation is itself clad in the meta-
assertoric armour of theA-operator. But why limit occurrences ofA to propositions
directly under the scope of negation? Why not let them float around freely? The
result would have the same logical possibilities open as in a system with an enorm-
ous multiplicity of connectives: for instance, if theA operator could freely occur
in any position around a disjunction, then the effects of having the following four
disjunctions would be available:ϕ ∨ ψ , Aϕ ∨ Aψ , Aϕ ∨ ψ andϕ ∨ Aψ .
There is no technical reason why theA operator should be restricted in its
occurrence to propositions directly under a negation, and we will outline a theory
(call it thefloatingA theory) where all occurrences of cancellation were explained
away in terms of the occurrence of such an operator.
How can we employ the resulting flexibility in a floatingA theory? For that we
need the following ingredients:
• each sentence is associated with asetof translations,
• over this set apreference orderis defined, and
• the translations have to satisfy certainconstraints.
These ingredients are present, at least conceptually, in Link (1986), an intentionally
idiosyncratic defense of partial logic in the analysis of presuppositions. Without
particularly wanting to commit ourselves to a specific version of a floatingA
theory, let us look at one simple, possible interpretation of it.
We start from a single partial logic, sayweak Kleene. First, we associate each
sentence with aset of translations. Consider (a disambiguated syntactic analysis
? External negation, given that it can be defined as¬A(ϕ) whereA is a sort of truth-operator, has
often been taken to model the English paraphrases “it is not true that” and “it is not the case that.”
Although it may be that occurrence of these extraposed negations is high in cases of presupposition
denial — we are not aware of any serious research on the empirical side of this matter — it is
certainly neither the case that the construction is used in all instances of presupposition denial, nor
that all uses of the construction prevent projection of embedded presuppositions. Thus the use of the
termexternalfor the weak negation operator, and the corresponding use of the terminternal for the
strong, is misleading and does not reflect a well-established link with different linguistic expressions
of negation.
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of) a sentenceS and suppose thatϕ is anA-free weak Kleene-based expression
representingS (the basic representation ofS). The reader may think ofϕ as the
TY32 representation ofS derived by the simple fragment sketched in Section 4.
?
It should be stressed, however, that the floatingA theory is not dependent on a
Montagovian foundation; it works for any partial logic.
DEFINITION 19 (Translation sets). The translation-set ofS (TS(S)) is the
smallest set such that:
1. ϕ ∈ TS(S), whereϕ is the basic representation ofS.
2. Any formula η that results from replacing all occurrences of one or more
formulaeχ which are of the formψ〈π〉 byAχ is an element ofTS(S).
Second, we need to define a preference order over the translation set. In considering
how to achieve this, it should be born in mind that the intention is to keep the
usage of theA operator as limited as possible; the default is that presuppositions
project. We shall interpret this as follows: ifγ andδ are both elements ofTS(S),
thenγ is preferred overδ (notation:γ ≺ δ) iff γ is optimal with respect to the
conditions (to be defined below) whileδ is not, and, failing that, if the number of
A operators occurring inγ is lower than the number ofA occurrences inδ. And
this immediately brings us to the third and final ingredient: the constraints. The
most basic constraint we pose isdefinedness, which says that an expression should
not always be neither True nor False. Put differently, we prefer formulae that make
sense over those that do not. Apart from that, we simply follow Stalnaker, van
der Sandt and others and just requireconsistencyandinformativity.?? Informativity
essentially says that no (sub-)formula should be redundant, consistency that no
(sub-)formula should be inconsistent. These conditions can be defined analogously
to the way van der Sandt’s (1992) conditions are defined in Beaver (1997: 981),
although we extend the idea developed there somewhat. In the following defini-
tion, anon-presuppositional subformulais simply one that does not occur in the
subscripted argument of a transplication.‡
? We will illustrate a different route in the Appendix. There an extension of the basic fragment
is described in which meta-assertions are part of the grammar and the notion of anoptimal treeis
directly defined, without using a seperate preference ordering over meanings.
?? These could also be termedlocal consistencyand local informativity, since they place
constraints on every sentential part of a formula.
‡ The definition of Van der Sandt (1992: 367) does not make it clear exactly how his notion of
local informativity is to be applied. On our understanding of his definition, it would predict that
in simple cases of presupposition denial, such as our (27) below, neither his operations ofglobal
nor local accommodationproduce an acceptable DRS. In particular, local accommodation would
produce a final DRS
[ | ¬[x | kof(x), bald(x)],¬[x | kof(x)]]
in which the negation of the first embedded sub-DRS (¬[x | kof(x), bald(x)]) seems to bentailed
(in Van der Sandt’s sense) by its superordinate DRS. We would argue that the current paper improves
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DEFINITION 20 (Definedness, (non-)informativity, and (in-)consistency).
− An expressionϕ is defined iff there is a modelM and a states such thatϕs is
either True or False inM.
− An expressionϕ is not informative to degreen iff it contains n non-
presuppositional subformulaeψ such that for any modelM and states, ϕs
is True inM iff {>/ψ}ϕs is True inM (where{>/ψ}ϕ is the expression
derived fromϕ by substituting the occurrence ofψ with > (the tautological
formula)).
− An expressionϕ is not consistentto degreen iff it contains n non-
presuppositional subformulaeψ such that for any modelM and states, ϕs
is True inM iff {⊥/ψ}ϕs is True inM (where{⊥/ψ}ϕ is the expression
derived fromϕ by substituting the occurrence ofψ with ⊥ (the contradictory
formula)).
The total incoherenceof a formula will be the sum of the degrees of non-
consistency and non-informativity.? Recall that we always prefer translations which
are defined and minimize incoherence and, failing that, which limit the number of
occurrences of the A-operator. Now consider the following example:
(27) The king of France isnot bald, since there is no king of France.
Schematically, an A-free translation of this sentence is represented by an
expression of the following form:λi(¬(ϕi〈πi〉) ∧̈ ¬πi), whereπ expresses the
proposition that there is a king of France andϕ that the king of France is bald.
The translation set of the above example,TS (27) contains two representations
according to Definition 19:
(i) λi(¬(ϕi〈πi〉) ∧̈ ¬πi),
(ii) λi(¬A(ϕi〈πi〉) ∧̈ ¬πi).
The default reading of (27) is (i), and it is easily seen that it does not meet the
consistency constraint: the second conjunct explicitly denies the presupposition of
the first conjunct. In this case, there is a high degree of incoherence, since one
could replace either the conjunction or one of its conjuncts by a contradiction
without changing the truth condition of the formula. Furthermore, the formula
upon Van der Sandt’s: either the partial treatment is empirically superior or, at least, the prediction
of the partial theory in these cases are clearer. It is worth pointing out here that Krahmer and van
Deemter (1997, 1998) have argued that informativity should not only apply at the level of (sub-)DRSs
but also at lower levels such as the representations of anaphors and antecedents.
? We are aware of the fact that the coherence conditions are representation-dependent (thus,ϕ is
more coherent thanϕ ∨ ¬>). However, recall that we apply the coherence conditions on represent-
ations derived by the Montagovian fragment. In Appendix A, this is made fully explicit by directly
defining trees which areoptimalwith respect to the conditions.
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under negation could be replaced by>. The second reading of (27), i.e., (ii), is
also incoherent, since the first conjunct is always true when the second conjunct
is true.? So the first conjunct could be replaced by>, or the formula (in the same
conjunct) under the negation by⊥ without affecting the formula’s truth condition.
However, the degree of incoherence of (ii), i.e., 2, is less than that of the other
translation. Hence, it is predicted that (ii) is the right representation in this case
and (27) is predicted to presuppose nothing, in particular not that there is a king of
France.
The discussion of the above example indicates that we can replace the lexical
ambiguity of negation, which is common in trivalent theories, by an essentially
structural ambiguity. In this respect, our account is not unlike the Russellian scope-
based explanation of projection facts.??
Let us now consider (24), repeated below as (28).
(28) Either Bill has just stopped smoking, or else he’s just started smoking.
An A-free translation of this sentence is represented, again somewhat schem-
atically, by a TY32 expression of the formλi(γ i〈πi〉 ∨̈ δi〈¬πi〉), whereπ is the
proposition that Bill has smoked before,γ the proposition that Bill has just stopped
smoking andδ that he has just started smoking. The translation set of this example
contains four TY32 expressions:
(i) λi(γ i〈πi〉 ∨̈ δi〈¬πi〉),
(ii) λi(A(γ i〈πi〉) ∨̈ δi〈¬πi〉),
(iii) λi(γ i〈πi〉 ∨̈ A(δi〈¬πi〉)),
(iv) λi(A(γ i〈πi〉) ∨̈ A(δi〈¬πi〉)).
Here (i) is the basic representation. It is easily seen that it presupposes a contradic-
tion and, hence, (i) does not meet the definedness requirement. What about the two
next representations in line: (ii) and (iii)? Inspection shows that these violate the
consistency requirement. For example, (ii) is only defined for worlds in which Bill
has not smoked before, and in all such worlds the left disjunct is false. So the left
disjunct could be replaced by⊥ without changing the truth condition of the larger
formula, which means that (ii) is incoherent to degree 1 (and similar for the other
disjunction). This leaves us with (iv), in which both presuppositions are wiped-
out/meta-asserted; this expression meets both the consistency and the informativity
condition and, as a consequence, (iv) is the only coherent and defined expression in
? It is interesting to observe that a speaker who utters (27) in fact only wants to communicate the
secondconjunct; that there is no king of France.
?? A very good discussion of this issue can be found in Horn (1985). He presents an in-depth
discussion of the debate between “ambiguists” (those who argue that negation in examples like (17)
gives rise to a semantic (scope) ambiguity, e.g., Russell, 1905) and “monoguists” (those who claim
that the ambiguity is essentially pragmatic, e.g., Atlas, 1975, 1976).
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the translation set. Thus, it is rightly predicted to be the correct reading of example
(28).?
Let us now illustrate the informativity condition. Reconsider (9), discussed
above as a counterexample to the cumulative hypothesis embodied by the weak
Kleene system and repeated below as (29).
(29) If Mary is sad, then Bill regrets that Mary is sad.
Schematically, this sentence could be represented by the following formula:
λi(πi →̈ δi〈πi〉), whereπ is the proposition that Mary is sad andδ the proposition
that Bill regrets this. The translation set for (29) includes the following expressions:
(i) λi(πi →̈ δi〈πi〉),
(ii) λi(πi →̈ A(δi〈πi〉)).
Some inspection shows that (i) violates the informativity constraint. If we replace
the antecedentπi with >, we end up with a formula which is True in precisely the
same circumstances as (i) itself. However, in (ii), in which the presupposition is
meta-asserted within the consequent of the conditional, the informativity condition
is met and thus (ii) is coherent. Hence, this expression is predicted to be the correct
representation of (9) and the example is correctly predicted not to presuppose that
Mary is sad.
5.3. ACCOMMODATION AND COMMON GROUND
Next, we consider another way in which the partial account may be extended so as
to incorporate a notion of accommodation. In fact, we believe it would be natural
to consider the floatingA theory as achieving what in Heim and van der Sandt’s
theory is achieved by so-calledlocal accommodation, but the accommodation
mechanism we now describe as pertaining to what Heim and Van der Sandt call
global accommodation.
We begin our discussion of (global) accommodation with the following ques-
tion: how can a partial account of presupposition be used to account for data based
on utterance (in-)felicity? Felicity, as regards cases of so-calledpr supposition
failure, does not depend on how the world is, but on what we know about it. A suf-
ficient condition for utterance infelicity might be that there is some presupposition
which is mutually believed to be false by speaker and hearer.
Suppose that we represent the common ground (mutual beliefs, pragmatic pre-
suppositions) as (the characteristic function of) a set of possible worlds, call itσ ,
which is of type(st). Then after an utterance of a sentenceS which has meaning
? Note that the floatingA theory predicts that ambiguities may arise due to the fact that≺ is not
in general a total order. However, we have been unable to construct examples that are sufficiently
natural that reliable judgements can be made about them. It would be interesting to further study this
issue, but here we refrain from doing so.
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ξ(st), we should expect the common ground to be characterized by the intersection
of the set ofσ -worlds with the set ofξ -worlds. Define:
α u β = λi(αi ∧ βi).
Then the new common ground would simply beσ u ξ . But a necessary condition
for common-ground update to occur (the reverse of the above sufficient condition
for infelicity, which here we identify with failure to enable an update) is that the
common ground supports all the presuppositions. Let us define a notion of subset
in the obvious way:
α v β = ∀i(αi → βi).
We can then use the presupposition (P ) and assertion (A) operators defined previ-
ously to obtain the following definition of an operatorupdate. Relative to a meaning
(ξ ), it defines a relation between input and output common grounds (σ andτ ):
update= λξλσλτ(σ v λi(P (ξ i)) ∧ τ = σ u λi(A(ξi))).
In general, ifξ has presuppositions, then the relationupdateξ will be equivalent to
a partial function, only defining an output for certain inputs, i.e., those where the
presuppositions are satisfied.
It has been argued that what is important for felicity is not the common ground
per se, but what the speaker takes (or appears to take) the common ground to
be (see, e.g., Stalnaker, 1974; Beaver, 1995, for a formalization of these ideas in
a dynamic perspective). As long as there is some plausible choice of an initial
common ground which can be updated with each successively uttered sentence
in a given monologue, then the discourse will be felicitous. It follows that we
can see a discourse as providing two sorts of information: information as to what
the initial common ground was taken to be and information as to what the final
common ground is expected to be. The initial common ground is constrained by
presupposition, and the relation between the initial and final common ground is
constrained by assertion. As observers, we cannot tell just by looking at a series
of sentences what the initial or final common grounds of the interlocutors was or
was taken to be, but we can limit the options that are consistent with the discourse
successfully having updated that common ground. Suppose that6 is a set of ini-
tially possible common grounds, each of the possibilities itself being classified (à
la Stalnaker) as a set of worlds. Then after each sentence there will be a new set
of possible common grounds which may be calculated through the following two-
stage procedure: firstly filter out those members of6 which are incompatible with
the presuppositions of the sentence, and then update each of the remaining possible
initial common grounds with the assertion.
With this in mind, we define a new update functionupdate? which, relative to
a sentential meaningξ , defines a function from an input set of sets of worlds to an
output set of sets of worlds.
update? = λξλ6λτ(∃σ (6σ ∧ updateξσ τ)).
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In a monologue situation, a hearer will be in essentially the same position as any
watching linguist, the situation of not knowing what the speaker takes the common
ground to be. At the beginning of the monologue, the hearer’s information, if that
hearer is making absolutely no assumptions about what the speaker takes to be
the common ground, could be modeled as the powerset of the set of worlds, i.e.,
λσ(>). The above definition then models the information that any hearer will gain
as a result of an update with each successive sentence. For example, if the meaning
of the first sentence of the monologue isξ1, then after accepting that sentence the
hearer’s model of the common ground will beλτ(∃σ (updateξ1στ)): call this62.
After processing the second sentence with meaningξ2, the hearer’s model of the
common ground will beλτ(∃σ (62σ ∧ updateξ2στ)), and so on.
The process whereby the hearer gains information via presuppositions is nor-
mally referred to asaccommodation, following Lewis (1979), albeit that this
process is commonly conceived of as a sort of erase-and-rewrite operation on
information states rather than as a filtering operation.
The above model of accommodation provides a transition from the partial se-
mantics of sentence meaning to the (dynamic) pragmatics of information update.
But it also provides a framework in which to account for certain inferences that
hearers make. For instance, note that whilst in the case of the Spaceman Spiff ex-
ample (26) above, a conditional presupposition (that if Spiff lands on X his weight
will be higher than on Earth) is intuitive, the presupposition apparently associated
with the following example is different:
(30) If Spaceman Spiff stands on the weighing scale, he will be bothered by the
fact that his weight is higher than it was yesterday.
Here we seem to conclude not that if Spiff stands on the scale his weight will
be higher than yesterday, but that his weight is highersimpliciter, regardless of
whether he stands on the scale or not. This inference could perhaps be explained if
it were assumed that the implausibility of Spiff’s weight being dependent on that
weight being measured results in a limitation on what are considered asiniti lly
plausible common grounds. In particular, we would have to assume that there are no
plausible initial common grounds such that in those worlds where Spiff is weighed,
he is heavier than those otherwise similar worlds in which he is not weighed.
Now this analysis is of course very tentative. And it is clear that in a full model
we would not want to depend on an absolute line drawn between plausible and
implausible common grounds, but on some sort of relative grading of the plausib-
ility of different common grounds.? But it should be clear that adding a dynamic
model of accommodation provides yet another way in which a partial theory of
presupposition can be made more flexible. It should also be clear that the notions
of assertion and presupposition defined previously provide an excellent platform
on which to build a dynamic model.
? In fact, the apparatus needed to make global accommodation dependent on the relative
plausibility of different common grounds is developed in Beaver (1999).
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we have been concerned to show that the most traditional of
approaches to presupposition remains feasible and open to further lines of develop-
ment. In particular, we have shown that natural extensions of partial propositional
logics to deal with quantification yield systems having desirable properties from
the point of view of the interaction between presuppositions and quantifiers, and
we have shown how Montague Grammar may be best adapted to the needs of a
partial account of presupposition projection based on the underlying logic of these
systems.
Going beyond these concrete results, we have discussed some obstinate points
of criticism which have been levelled at accounts of presupposition projection us-
ing partial logic. We have shown that these in fact do not provide insurmountable
problems for the partial approach. We have explored some possible ways of extend-
ing a partiality-based treatment of presupposition. Let us finish by summarizing the
conclusions we wish to draw from these last explorations. We have argued that it is
possible that a partial account of presupposition might be given the sort of flexibil-
ity needed to account for a range of counterexamples to traditional partiality-based
theories. But the danger of making this move is of creating a theory which is so
flexible that it also introduces unwanted readings, and thus new counterexamples.
To control this flexibility, a method of constraining readings is necessary. We have
discussed three relatively straightforward constraints, namely definedness, inform-
ativity and consistency. But more constraints are likely to play a role. Similarly,
with regard to the proposed model of global accommodation, the exact predictions
of the extended model will depend on exactly what is accommodated, and this in
turn will depend on the notion ofplausible initial common ground. But we have
not provided any discussion of the issue of what should constitute a plausible initial
common ground.
We accept that in a fully developed theory, the constraints on readings, and on
common grounds, may take up a considerable burden. It is clear that constraints
on readings would ultimately have to take into account a range of pragmatic con-
siderations, such ascoherenceof the discourse as a whole.? And it is clear that
any account of the constraints on common grounds would ultimately involve a
discussion of the role of default assumptions and world knowledge.?? It should be
stressed, however, that in this respect the partial approach described in this paper
is not different from other current theories of presupposition. For example, the
account of Van der Sandt (1992), in many respects the most empirically success-
? Consider, e.g., the common observation that cancellation examples typically occur within deni-
als, and then with marked intonation. See Blok (1993) and Van der Sandt (to appear) for discussion.
To predict when a cancellation reading is available, we will have to take into account not only whether
other readings are consistent with established knowledge, but also whether the discourse context and
intonation contour allows for a cancellation reading.
?? For a formal model of the interaction between world knowledge and presupposition projection,
see, e.g., Krahmer and Piwek (1999).
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ful of contemporary presupposition theories (Beaver, 1997), does not involve any
formal reference to world knowledge or default knowledge. In fact, there is, to the
best of our knowledge, no theory of presupposition which employs a full-fledged
pragmatic component dealing with the influence of coherence, common ground,
world knowledge and default assumptions and their relation with presupposition
projection.?
The question of what role would remain for partial logic, given further sophist-
icated pragmatic extensions, must for now remain open. At least the possibility of
pragmatic extensions such as we have described in this paper shows that none of
the examples standardly conceived as problematic in fact provides a knock-down
argument against partiality based accounts of presupposition. The partial treatment
of presupposition would be worth pursuing if only because it can continue to teach
us lessons that inform technically related alternatives, such as those utilising a
dynamic semantics. Having considered elsewhere the strengths and weaknesses
of a range of contemporary theories of presupposition (Beaver, 1997), we believe
a stronger claim is in order. A suitably developed partial treatment of presuppos-
ition can match or better the empirical coverage of any alternative yet proposed.
In sum: we can say that a century after Frege initiated the partial treatment of
presupposition, there remain promising and largely unexplored areas for future
research.
Appendix A: The Fragment
This appendix lists all the relevant definitions which together formPresuppos-
itional Montague Grammar. As in the main text, the emphasis will be on the
semantics. For an extensive presentation ofb th the syntaxand the semantics
of classical Montague Grammar in terms of type theory, the reader is referred
to Muskens (1989). Additionally, we shall not specify the syntactic operations
which map analysis trees to phrases of English as these are closely related to the
operations defined in Muskens (1989: 28–29).?? Extensions of the basic Presup-
positional Montague Grammar fragment with additional presupposition triggers
such as “even” and “too” can be found in Krahmer (1998: 146–147). The set of
categories is defined as follows:
DEFINITION 21 (Categories).
1. E is a category;S is a category;
2. If A andB are categories, thenA/B andA//B are categories.
The following table lists the categories that we actually use in the fragment:
? Asher and Lascarides (1998) make considerable progress towards this goal in their SDRT
framework.
?? With some relatively straightforward extensions, e.g., [hen ’s] should be mapped to “his” or
“her” depending on the gender of the relevant CN.
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Category Abbreviation Basic Expressions
S
S/E VP whistle, be rewarded
S//E CN man, bicycle, king, nation
S/VP NP Bill, Mary, George V, somebody, everyone, hen,
for n ∈ IN
VP/VP try to, manage to
VP/S regret
VP/NP TV succeed, push, love, serve, cherish
NP/CN DET every, a, the
CN/CN ADJ fat
DET/NP POSS ’s
We only use three of Montague’s syntactic rules (besides the basic rule): functional
application, quantifying-in and relative clause formation. We add rules for meta-
assertions and the connectives.
DEFINITION 22 (Syntactic Trees).
1. BASIC:
If α is a basic expression of categoryA, then[α]A is a tree.
2. FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION:
If [ξ ]A/mB and[ϑ]B are trees, then[[ξ ]A/mB [ϑ]B ]Afa is a tree (m ∈ {1,2}).
3. QUANTIFYING -IN:
If [ξ ]NP and[ϑ]S are trees, then[[ξ ]NP [ϑ]S]Sqi,n is a tree, forn ∈ IN .
4. RELATIVE CLAUSE FORMATION:
If [ξ ]CN and[ϑ]S are trees, then[[ξ ]CN [ϑ]S]CN,nrcf is a tree, forn ∈ IN .
5. META-ASSERTION:
If [ξ ]S is a tree, then[[ξ ]S ]Sma is a tree.
6. CONNECTIVES:
If [ξ ]S and[ϑ]S are trees, then so are:
(a) [[ξ ]S and[ϑ]S]Sconj
(b) [[ξ ]S or [ϑ]S]Sdisj
(c) [if [ξ ]S then[ϑ]S]Simp
(d) [it is not the case that[ξ ]S]Sneg
Let us now focus on the semantics. The following definition maps (syntactic)
categories to (semantic) types.
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DEFINITION 23 (Category-to-type Rule).
1. TYPE2(E) = e;TYPE2(S) = (st);
2. TYPE2(A/B) = TYPE2(A//B) = (TYPE2(B)TYPE2(A)).
We use the following terms in the representations:
Type Constants Variables
e b,m,g x, y
s i, j
st P
e(st) whistle, reward Pi
e(st) man, bike, king, nation Pi





The function(.)• gives us the translation of the syntactic trees in TY32.
?
DEFINITION 24 (Translation). For each tree[ξ ] define its translationξ • as
follows:
1. BASIC
whistle• = whistle, be rewarded• = reward;
man• = man, bicycle• = bike, king• = king, nation• = nation;
Bill • = λP (P b), George V• = λP (P g), Mary• = λP (P m),
somebody• = λPλi∃x(P xi), everyone• = λPλi∀x(P xi),
hen
• = λP (P xn);
try to• = try; manage to• = λPλxλi(P xi〈(difficult P) xi〉);
succeed• = λQλy(Qλx(succeedxy)), push• = λQλy(Qλx(pushxy)),
love• = λQλy(Qλx(lovexy)), serve• = λQλy(Qλx(servexy))
cherish• = λQλy(Qλx(cherishxy));
regret• = λPλxλi(regretP xi〈P i〉);
every• = λP1λP2λi∀x(P1 xi →̈ P2 xi),
a• = λP1λP2λi∃x(P1 xi ∧̈ P2 xi),
the• = λP1λP2λi(∃x(P1 xi ∧̈ P2 xi)〈∃!xP1 xi〉);
’s• = λQλP1λP2λi
(∃x(P1 xi ∧̈ Qλy(of yx)i ∧̈ P2 xi)〈∃!x(P1 xi ∧̈ Qλy(of yx)i)〉);
fat• = fat;
? Here we assume Weak Kleene connectives for the sake of concreteness, but it should be clear
that the approach would work equally for any other choice of connectives.
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2. FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION
([ξϑ]fa)• = ξ •ϑ•;
3. QUANTIFYING -IN
([ξϑ]qi,n)• = ξ •λxn(ϑ•);
4. RELATIVE CLAUSE FORMATION
([ξϑ]nrcf)• = λxnλi(ξ • xni ∧̈ ϑ• i);
5. META-ASSERTION
([ξ ]Sma)• = λi(A(ξ •i));
6. CONNECTIVES
([ξ andϑ]Sconj)• = λi(ξ •i ∧̈ ϑ•i),
([ξ or ϑ]Sdisj)• = λi(ξ •i ∨̈ ϑ•i),
([if ξ thenϑ]Simp)• = λi(ξ •i →̈ ϑ•i),
([it is not the case thatξ ]Sneg)• = λi(¬(ξ •i)).
Finally, we define the notion of anoptimal treefor a given sentence. There is an
advantage to directly defining which trees corresponding to a sentence are (presup-
positionally) optimal, rather than defining an ordering over meanings as in the main
text of this article. The advantage is that we avoid commitment to any particular
form of semantic representation. Thus, by spelling out the notion ofoptimal tree
below, we show that, just as in ordinary Montague Grammar, type-theoretic rep-
resentations are dispensable in the version of Presuppositional Montague Grammar
extended with the floatingA theory of preferred interpretation.
In the case of a sentence in which there is no denial of presupposed material, the
optimal trees will simply be those lacking any operation of meta-assertion. Other-
wise, the optimal trees will be those involving a minimal number of applications
of meta-assertion such that informativity and consistency are maintained. Note that
the definitions below are not affected by the fact that even in the grammar without
meta-assertion, a single sentence may have a non-singleton translation set as a
result of applications of quantifying in. The definitions allow for the possibility of
multiple optimal trees for a given sentence, differing either by positioning of an A-
operator or by application of quantifier raising. The relation “is an A-expansion of”
used in the definition of Optimal Trees is the tree-level counterpart of the relation
between meanings≺.
DEFINITION 25 (Optimal Trees).
1. The set ofA-expansionsof the treeξ is the smallest set6 such that:
if ϑ ∈ (6∪{ξ }) andϑ contains a subtree[τ ]S , then{[[τ ]S ]Sma/[τ ]S}ϑ ∈ 6,
where{A/B}C isC but with the subtreeB replaced byA.
2. Let TAUTOLOGY be an abbreviation for the simplest tree corresponding to
the sentence “Bill whistles or it is not the case that Bill whistles.” Let
A PARTIAL ACCOUNT OF PRESUPPOSITION PROJECTION 179
CONTRADICTION be an abbreviation for the simplest tree corresponding to
the sentence “Bill whistles and it is not the case that Bill whistles.” Finally,
let UNDEFINED be an abbreviation for the simplest tree corresponding to the
sentence “Bill regretsCONTRADICTION.” Then:
− A treeξ is not definediff (ξ)• ⇔ (UNDEFINED)•
− A tree ξ is incoherentto degreen if there aren sentential subtreesϑ such
that either:
(ξ)• is True iff ({TAUTOLOGY/ϑ}ξ)• is True or
(ξ)• is True iff ({CONTRADICTION/ϑ}ξ)• is True
3. Let6 be the A-expansions of some treeξ that lacks any nodes of the form
[ϑ]Sma, plusξ itself. A treeϑ ∈ 6 is optimal iff
(a) ϑ is defined,
(b) No member of6 is less incoherent thanϑ , and
(c) ϑ is not an A-expansion of any member of6 of identical incoherence.
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